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Menno Hulswit
Teleology: A Peircean Critique 
of Ernst Mayr’s Theory1
... the non-recognition of final causation ... has been and still 
is productive of more philosophical error and nonsense than 
any or every other source of error or nonsense. I f  there is 
any goddess of nonsense, this must be her haunt. (C.S. Peirce,
MS 478, 1903)2
I, Introduction
The problem o f teleology is the question whether all natural p ro ­
cesses can be adequately explained in terms of efficient causality. In 
contemporary philosophy and science there is a strong aversion to 
explanations by final causation; most approaches consider teleologi- 
cal processes as a special kind of mechanical processes, and try to 
reduce teleological explanations to explanations based solely on effi­
cient causation.3 Typical examples of such reductionist strategies are 
the system theoretical and cybernetical approaches.4 Furthermore, 
there are the approaches of certain evolutionary biologists who main­
tain on the one hand that biology cannot do without teleological 
language, but on the other hand insist that the explanations of bio­
logical processes need to be based on nothing but efficient causa­
tion.5
Although it is currently held that there are no final causes in 
nature, the proponents of the reductionist strategy do not provide us 
with a clear theory of causality that shows how teleological processes
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can be explained by efficient causation alone. At the present m o­
ment, no clear theory of teleological processes is available.
However, the problem o f teleology shows up time and again in 
all kind of discussions; it is not only prominent in debates on biologi­
cal evolution and biological behavior, but also in discussions about 
other areas of physical science, perhaps most prominently in physical 
cosmology.6
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first objective is to give 
an outline of Peirce’s view of final causation. The second objective is 
to use some of Peirce’s insights in order to show that most contem ­
porary debates on teleology are based on dubious presuppositions. 
More specifically, the second objective is to offer a Peircean critique 
of the theory of teleology held by Ernst Mayr, one o f the most promi­
nent contemporary philosophers of biology.7
My analysis will be confined to Mayr’s view, as set forth in his 
famous 1974 article, “Teleological and Teleonomic, A New Analy­
sis,”8 for two reasons. First, it has had a tremendous influence on 
later discussions about final causation, even far beyond the scope of 
biological theory. Secondly, it contains a number o f disputable pre­
suppositions shared — and probably borrowed from Mayr —  by most 
contemporary philosophers o f  biology and of science in general.
II. Peirces Conception of Final Causation
In this section the following themes concerning Peirce’s theory 
of teleology will be discussed: (2.1) final causation, (2.2) the rela­
tionship between final causation and efficient causation, (2.3) the 
difference between mechanical and teleological processes, (2,4) tele­
ology and objective chance, and lastly (2.5), the idea that teleology is 
creative,
2.1 The nature o f fin a l causation
Much of the aversion o f contemporary philosophy o f science re­
garding teleology is based on the erroneous view that teleological 
explanations imply final causes that are concrete future events. Such
backward causation is rightly rejected because it is thought to be 
incompatible with the current views of efficient causation. Indeed, 
how could future events cause present events at all, if they do not yet 
exist? Thus, the idea of final causation as backward causation is pre­
posterous. Peirce’s critique of this erroneous view of teleology was in 
this respect in total agreement with Aristotle’s view. Moreover, like 
Aristotle, Peirce endorsed the view that the conception of final causa­
tion is explicitly and intentionally anthropomorphic.9 While warning 
us n o t to identify final causes with conscious goals — “a purpose is 
merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our experi­
ence” (C P  1.211, 1902) — Peirce used the model of goal-directed 
experience as point o f  departure of his analysis.
This, o f  course, raises the problem of anthropomorphism, i.e. 
the problem o f  the justification of the ascription o f  human character­
istics to  non-human beings or things. Peirce, however, persists that 
anthropomorphism is simply unavoidable. All our ideas in one way or 
another refer to our human experience (MS 293, 1-2, 1906). The 
same holds for our theoretical concepts and scientific explanations: 
“every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis 
that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analo­
gous; and that it really is so all the successes of science in its applica­
tions to human convenience are witnesses” (CP 1.316, 1903). Ideas 
of, say, causation, action, force, energy, motion, natural selection, 
etc» are all anthropomorphical because they all find their origin in 
human experience. Consider the idea of causation: “The very con­
ception of causality has its origin in our tendency to seek relations in 
nature analogous to intellectual relations” (MS963, c.1893). O r con­
sider the idea o f natural selection: it is only by analogy to human acts 
of selection that this idea makes any sense. Thus, all theoretical ideas 
in one way or another originate in and refer to human experience. If  
they did not, they would be meaningless: for, if they are to  have any 
meaning at all, there must be some kind of relationship between them 
and our daily human experience. Consequently, far from being a prob­
lem, anthropomorphism is a sheer necessity.
The first thing we notice when considering our own goal-di­
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rected behavior, is that, contrary to what is usually believed, our goals 
are neither things nor events. According to Peirce, goals are nothing 
but ‘operative desires1, the objects o f  which are never concrete, but 
always general. Something desired is always something o f a certain 
kind. We want a certain kind o f  apple pie, not one specific individual 
specimen (CP 1.341, c.1895). O f course, there are all kinds o f levels 
of generality, and one goal may be more specific (less general) than 
the other: we may want an apple pie made of a special kind  o f  apples 
and a special kind o f dough. But even then, the object remains gen­
eral. Accordingly, we can see that final causes are genem l, and not 
concrete.
If final causes are general, they cannot be events either, because 
events are always individual. My wishing to eat an apple pie is an 
event which directs me toward some end. While the wish itself is an 
event, what it is I wish is o f the nature of an idea, or a general type. 
Consequently, to regard final causes as concrete events is a category 
mistake.10
Furthermore, our conscious goals do not work from the future 
toward the present. One may have a purpose and only later be able to 
realize it, if at all, but that does not imply that there is an influence 
from the future on the present moment. At the present moment, the 
future is not there yet, nor can it influence anything. Thus, final causes 
cannot bt  future events; they are general types which may be realized 
in the future. These general types are no actual existences, but gen­
eral (physical) possibilities for future realization.
These preliminary considerations may enable us to better under­
stand Peirce’s conception of final causation. Peirce gives the follow­
ing description of final causation:
... we must understand by final causation that mode of bring­
ing facts about according to which a general description of 
result is made to come about, quite irrespective of any com ­
pulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way; 
although the means may be adapted to the end. The general 
result may be brought about at one time in one way, and at
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another time in another way. Final causation does not deter­
mine in what particular way it is to be brought about, but 
only that the result shall have a general character. (CP 1.211,
1902)
Elsewhere Peirce calls a final cause “a tendency to produce some 
determinate kinds of effect” (MS 682, 5-6, c. 1895). About such ten­
dencies Peirce makes the following observation:
By a tendency to an end, I mean that a certain result will be 
brought about, or approached, and in such a way that if, 
within limits, its being brought about by one line o f me­
chanical causation be prevented, it will be brought about, or 
approached, by an independent line of mechanical causation.
(NEM> IV,66, 1902)
Thus, the final cause is not an existing thing at all. Indeed, it may 
be misleading to call it a ‘cause,’ for this term — at least in its regular 
modern sense — suggests that some concrete, existing thing, or event, 
or fact, has a determinate influence on another thing, or event, or 
fact. The final cause is not a concrete thing, but it is a type, a mere 
possibility; it is nothing but an ideal end state which a process tends 
toward.
Peirce call this tendency toward an end state a cause, because he 
attaches great value to the original meaning of concepts.11 According 
to its original, Aristotelian, meaning, a cause is some kind of condi­
tion without which a thing would not be what it is. Thus Peirce’s 
notion of cause is much more general than the modern notion, which 
restricts the term to the Aristotelian efficient cause.12 According to 
Peirce, some reference to a final cause is required in any explanation 
o f a teleological process, because the final cause is a determinant o f 
it.13
This may be illustrated by the example of thermodynamic p ro ­
cesses. These are teleological, because they tend toward an ultimate 
state of relative stability:
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Those non-conservative actions which seem to violate the 
law of energy, and which physics explains away as due to 
chance action among trillions of molecules, are one and all 
marked by two characters. The first is that they act in one 
determinate direction and tend asymptotically toward bring­
ing about an ultimate state o f things. If teleological is too 
strong a word to apply to them, we might invent the word 
finious, to express their tendency toward a final state. The 
other character of non-conservative action is that they are 
irreversible. (C P 7.471, c.1898)
Finious processes are marked by two characters: (a) they tend 
asymptotically toward an end state, and (b) they are irreversible. Peirce 
hesitates to call thermodynamic processes teleological in a strict sense, 
because the end state is only approximated and never completely 
reached. Although they are teleological in a somewhat weak sense, 
they are nevertheless teleological, because the convergence cannot 
be explained by reference to the innumerable separate forces (effi­
cient causes) alone; it can only be explained by statistical laws. C on­
sider for example the diffusion o f gases: whatever the initial state of 
the gas and the countless small forces which the different molecules 
exert upon each other may be, these do not suffice to predict the end 
state of the gas. Such prediction requires a knowledge o f  the relevant 
statistical laws, which are final causes in the Peircean sense ( C P 6.24, 
1898; NEM> IV,66, 1902),14
Thus, we may conclude that, according to Peirce, final causes are 
general types that control the efficient causation; they determine that 
the effects brought about by efficient causation are of a certain gen­
eral character. The final cause determines what kind of means are 
suitable for reaching the general end. Moreover: final causes specify 
which efficient causes advance the realization of that final cause ( CP 
2.149,1902). Whenever someone wants to realize an idea, this idea 
functions as a principle of selection in the choice of the appropriate 
means (‘lines of mechanical causation5) whereby the idea is to be 
realized. If one wants to build a house, he does not approach his
Teleology: A  Pe ir ce an Critique of Ernst Mayras Theory 188
objective by going for a swim, because swimming is not an appropri­
ate means for building a house. The selection o f the means may vary, 
as long as they are appropriate to the building of the house. A house 
b rought about in a different way will no doubt be a (somewhat) dif­
ferent house, bu t it will still be a house. The fact that the means may 
be varied and yet may lead to a result o f  the same general type, can 
only be explained if we presume that the general type governs the 
whole process, and this general type is what is meant by ‘final cause.5
We may now define final causes provisionally as follows: f in a l  
causes are general types that tend to realize themselves by determining  
processes o f mechanical causation. Final causes are not fu ture events, 
but general (physical) possibilities which may be realized in the fu ture. 
The symptoms o f fin a l causation are (a) that the end state o f a process 
may be reached in different ways, and (b) that the process is irreversible.
2 ,2 F inal causation and efficient causation
A profound  understanding o f Peirce’s conception o f  teleology 
requires a clear view o f  how he conceives the relationship between 
final and efficient causation. Peirce gives the following description o f  
efficient causation:
Efficient causation [...] is a compulsion determined by the 
particular condition o f things, and is a compulsion acting to  
make that situation begin to change in a perfectly determ i­
nate way; and what the general character of the result may 
be in no way concerns the efficient causation. (CP  1.212, 
1902)
Thus, efficient causation, as opposed to final causation, is not d i­
rected toward an end in any way; it is blind compulsion.
To clarify the relationship between final and efficient causation, 
Peirce gives the example of someone who has the intention to shoot 
a bird. To hit the bird, he does not shoot directly at it, but a little 
ahead o f  it, taking into account the distance that the bird will fly 
before the buliet reaches it. This activity is end-directed, and thus
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belongs to final causation. But as soon as the bullet has left the rifle, 
there is only the stupid, blind efficient causation which in no way is 
concerned about the results o f  its activity; the bullet will not follow 
the bird swooping in another direction. Efficient causation has no 
regard whatever for results; it simply “obeys orders blindly” ( CP 1,212,
1902).
While efficient causation, considered apart from its final 
causational component, is a dyadic (two-term) relation between two 
concrete individual events or facts, final causation is a triadic (three- 
term) relation15 between the general final cause, the concrete effi­
cient cause, and its concrete effect. The production of the individual 
effect (B) by the individual efficient cause (A) is determined, or me­
diated, by the general final cause (C’). The efficient cause functions 
as a means for the attainment of the end (the motion of the bullet is 
the means for the shooting o f the bird, which is the end). Schemati­
cally this may be represented as follows:
C ’ (final cause)
AA (cause) ^  x  B (effect, means) — > C (effect, realized end)
The relationship between A, B, and C ’ is triadic. At the time of the 
causation, the concrete, realized end C does not yet exist. Conse­
quently, the causation o f B by A cannot be influenced by C (there is 
no backward causation), Instead, it is determined by possibility C \  
The individual event o f  the bird’s dying does not direct the shooting, 
but the general purpose o f the hunter does. At the moment of the 
shooting this purpose has not yet been realized; it is a mere idea, that 
is to say, a physical possibility.
Most contemporary philosophers of science think that final cau­
sation and efficient causation preclude one another. The example of 
the shooting of the bird, however, illustrates that final causation and 
efficient causation are complementary. First, there plainly is no final 
causation without efficient causation. To shoot a bird it does not 
suffice to direct one’s gun; one also needs the motion o f  a bullet
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which blindly obeys the action of the trigger Conversely, there is no 
efficient causation without final causation. For, even after the bullet 
has left the rifle, it conforms to a general law, the causality of which is 
of the order o f  final causality:16 “Thus, the relation of a law, as a 
cause, to the action o f  force, as its effect, is final causation, not effi^
den t causation” ( CP 1.212,1902). The bullet conforms, among other 
things, to the law of gravity, which “might without falsity be con­
ceived as a final cause, since it certainly destines things ultimately to 
approach the centre of the earth” (MS 682, 7, 1913).
Peirce wraps up this insight regarding the basic complementarity 
o f efficient and final causation in the form of his famous analogy of 
the court and the sheriff:
T he court cannot be imagined without a sheriff. Final cau­
sality cannot be imagined without efficient causality; but no 
whit the less on that account are their modes of action polar 
contraries. The sheriff would still have his fist, even if there 
were no court; but an efficient cause, detached from a final 
cause in the form o f a law, would not even possess efficiency”
(C P  1.213). [...] Final causation without efficient causation 
is helpless [...], Efficient causation without final causation, 
however, is worse than helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and 
chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final causation it 
is blank nothing” . (C P 1.220, 1902)
H ence, final causation and efficient causation are not two different 
types o f causation, each of which would act in different situations. In 
each act o f causation, there is an efficient and a final component. 
While being caused by previous events, each event is part o f  a process 
which is governed by a final cause. This entails that causal explana­
tions are not more valid than teleological explanations; they just serve 
a different aim. Whereas causal explanations explain individual events 
on the basis o f  previous events and laws, teleological explanations tell 
us what general principle determines the tendency of a process.
To summarize: according to Peirce, every teleological process im-
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plies a triadic relationship between an individual efficient causey a gen­
eral fina l causey and an individual effect. Final causation and effi­
cient causation are complementary inasmuch as each act o f causation 
involves both an efficient component and a fina l component.
2.3 Teleological and mechanistic processes; Peirce's rejection o f dualism
If  final causation and efficient causation are complementary, a 
closer examination o f  their relationship cannot be avoided. This will 
be done by focussing upon processes. In this section I will explain the 
difference between teleological and mechanical processes. I t  will be 
seen that the problem regarding the relationship between the m e­
chanical and the teleological aspects of natural processes involves the 
concepts o f continuity and chance.
In Peirce’s view, mechanical behavior is characterized by the fol­
lowing properties: ( I )  the end state depends completely upon the 
situation at the beginning; (2) there is only one way in which the end 
state can be reached; (3) mechanical behavior is completely reversible 
in the sense that knowledge o f  the end state and the relevant laws of
nature make it possible to retrodict the initial state (MS 1343, 26-7; 
1902).
But, paradoxically, and contrary to what is sometimes suggested, 
‘pure5 mechanical behavior does not exist in Peirce’s universe. For 
example, in an article about Peirce’s conception of final causation, 
T.L. Short speaks o f  “ completely mechanical” processes, and o f  enti­
ties that “may operate mechanically or by efficient causation [...] 
[while] others may operate by final causation.1’17 Expressions such as 
these are misleading. Peirce rejects the view that there are two kinds 
of fundamentally different processes for the same reason that he re­
jects every sort of dualism. The core of his argument is related to his 
synechism, which is “ that tendency of philosophical thought which 
insists upon the idea o f continuity as of prime importance in philoso­
phy and, in particular, upon the necessity of hypotheses involving 
true continuity” (CP  6.169, 1902). Peirce tells us how synechism 
involves the rejection of dualism:
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... dualism in its broadest legitimate meaning as the philoso­
phy which performs its analyses with an axe, leaving as the 
ultimate elements, unrelated chunks of being, this is most 
hostile to  synechism. In particular, the synechist will no t ad­
m it that physical and psychical [read: mechanical and teleo­
logical18] phenom ena are entirely distinct — whether as be­
longing to  different categories of substance, or as entirely 
separate sides o f one shield — but will insist that all phenom­
ena are o f one character, though some are more mental and 
spontaneous, others more material and regular. Still, all alike 
present th a t mixture of freedom and constraint, which al­
lows them  to  be, nay, makes them to be teleological, or pur­
posive. ( C P 7 .570 ,1892 ; italics mine).
Clearly, Peirce’s synechism, which is a regulative principle of logic 
and o f  metaphysics,19 rejects dualistic philosophies because they are 
all based on inexplicable ultimates. Synechism amounts to the prin­
ciple that “whatever is supposed to be ultimate is supposed to be 
inexplicable,” and that “inexplicabilities are not to be considered as 
possible explanations” (C P 6.173, 1902). Thus, synechism is com ­
mitted to the idea that “ all phenomena are of one character
Interestingly, synechism also involves an element o f  chance. 
Chance is related to the fact that the laws of mechanics never agree 
completely w ith the course o f events. What we are inclined to call 
mechanical processes are processes that approach the laws o f  mechanics 
to a high degree, without ever doing so perfectly. Thus, the laws o f  
nature are primarily formal laws, and as such they are independent o f  
the m atter in which they work. The laws of mechanics are laws that 
are the  same in all possible worlds. As such, they lack an inherent 
drive toward self-realization. And thus, they fail to represent what is 
distinctive o f  real laws: ua real and living action in nature.”20
But, wherever there is “a real and living action in nature,” there 
is also objective chance. Though objective chance involves novelty, 
which is n o t reducible to any law, the action of chance does not yield 
randomness, for its effects are always subject to certain statistical laws.
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According to Peirce, this “mixture of freedom and constraint” has 
“inevitable teleological results” {EPl ,  236, 1885). For instance in 
gambling, the overall end state of a series of games can be predicted 
on the basis o f  particular statistical laws, and knowledge of the bound­
ary conditions (the num ber of players and the amount of money they 
deposit) and the pertinent statistical laws (which are determined by 
the rules o f the game) enables one to predict the percentage o f play­
ers who will win a certain amount of the money, the percentage that 
inevitably will loose, etc. (EP I, 270-1, c.1887).
Granted, in “mechanical processes” the degree o f deviation from 
the deterministic laws is minimal, and thus the degree of finality is 
very low. But even so, the fact remains that in some way, &//processes 
are teleological, even though there is a difference in the degree of 
finality. Mechanical processes are teleological processes with a negli­
gible degree of finality. Final causation in mechanical processes may 
be viewed as a degenerate kind of final causation.21
Though I have not explained yet the precise meaning o f 'ob jec­
tive chance,5 it should be sufficiently clear that, in Peirce’s view, a 
teleological process is not merely an evolutio in its original, Ciceronian 
sense, according to which evolution consists in the unrolling of a 
scroll. Instead of being a strictly deterministic process, teleology is 
decisively creative, albeit in a very specific sense which has yet to be 
examined.
2.4 Teleology and objective chance
I f  we are to understand in what sense teleology is connected with 
creativity, it will be necessary to elucidate Peirce’s concept o f chance 
as well as his concept o f  developmental teleology. In this section, we 
will first explore the meaning of ‘objective chance/ and then the 
relationship between teleology and chance. In the next section, the 
idea of developmental teleology will be discussed.
Contrary to what is often thought, and contrary to what Peirce 
himself writes in his earliest texts on chance, it would appear that 
‘objective chance’ does not refer to a special kind of events that hap­
pen only every now and then. Hilary Putnam for example, in his
recent introduction to Peirce’s Reasoning and the Logic of Things, 
writes: “such indeterminism as Peirce postulated consists in the very 
rare occurrence o f  chance events.”22 This formulation smacks o f a 
bifurcation of nature into a realm of chance events and a realm o f 
completely mechanical events, which, as we have seen, Peirce cat­
egorically rejects. Putnam seems to view chance events as uncaused 
events, or in his own words, as “rare spontaneous events,” But there 
is every reason to believe that this cannot possibly have been Peirce’s 
view. Though there is some indication that Peirce believed that there 
are uncaused events,23 it may be argued that his position is far more 
subtle in that it affirms that every event is partly uncaused.24 This 
view is conformed by Peirce’s explanation of the variety and increas­
ing complexity of the universe:
By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character o f  
the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained 
within the narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal 
departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite 
infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of the
universe, in the only sense in which the really suigeneris and
i
new can be accounted for. (£ P I ,  308, 1892; italics mine)
i
i
This text was taken from his “Doctrine of Necessity,” in which he 
proposes “ to examine the common belief that every single fact in the 
universe is precisely determined by law” (EP I, 298). Clearly, Peirce 
not only rejects the view that there are some facts or events25 that are 
not precisely determined by law; his position is far more radical: no 
event is ever completely determined by a law; each event is character­
ized by an aspect of irreducible novelty
Since each event involves an element of objective chance, and 
since the action o f chance has “inevitable ideological results” (which 
are determined by certain statistical laws), each event has to be part 
of a causal chain that develops into a definite direction. Hence, o b ­
jective chance must involve teleology
But, conversely, there can be no teleology without chance. With-
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out chance, all processes would be purely mechanical (deterministic). 
The variety in the world as well as the possibility of there being differ­
ent routes leading toward the same end state, can, in Peirce’s view, 
only be explained by chance. Besides, it is chance that accounts for 
the irreversibility o f natural processes, without which there would 
not be any teleology. Hence, final causation and chance presuppose 
one another. And since the same holds for final causation and effi­
cient causation, we may conclude that according to Peirce, every event 
(as part o f  a natural process) is characterized by an aspect of final 
causation, efficient causation and chance.26 If this is correct, it entails 
that all ideological processes are in some sense creative: they presup­
pose an aspect o f irreducible novelty at every stage of the process. 
This is the reason why final causes cannot specify exact results. By 
rcjccting strict determinism, according to which the definiteness of  
the world is given throughout all time, Peirce defends the fundamen­
tal creativity of the world: reality is always reality in the making.
2.5  Teleology as creative; developmental teleology
Before examining what other forms o f  creativity may be involved 
in teleology, we must have a clear idea o f  what we mean by that term. 
In an article on cosmic creativity in Peirce, Carl Hausman defines 
‘creativity’ as follows: “a creative act issues in an outcome that is new 
in kind, which was unpredictable, and which has a definite character 
that is neither reducible to the sum o f its elements nor exhaustively 
traceable to its antecedents.”27 The creativity o f a process is seen as 
equivalent to the irreducibility o f  the outcome of a process to any­
thing that proceeded that outcome. Hartshorne, on the other hand, 
who was also influenced by Peirce, stresses the positive side of cre­
ativity: “it does not mean merely that what happens is »of fully speci­
fied by the causal conditions and laws; it means that there is more 
definiteness in reality after a causal situation has produced its effect 
than before. This increase ox growth in richness of determinations is 
not an absence o f something, it is a positive presence.”28 Both 
I Iausman’s and I-Iartshorne’s approaches may be combined by defin­
ing creativity as follows: a process is creative whenever it is incom­
pletely determined by the causal conditions and laws (final causes), 
and is therefore unpredictable in minute detail. Each stage o f the 
p rocess  involves “ an addition  to the definiteness o f  rea lity” 
(H artsh o rn e’s expression).
According to the Peircean interpretation, creativity thus con­
ceived, involves three elements: (1) the events involved within the 
process, (2) the process itself, and (3) the end state o f the process. 
The first aspect I have considered already in the previous section; 
each event is creative to the extent that it contains an element of 
irreducible novelty. Here, we will concentrate on the two other as­
pects o f  creativity.
(2) It has been explained already in considerable detail, that one 
o f  the main characteristics o f final causation is that the end state o f a 
process can be reached in different ways. This entails that the ways 
toward the end state are not determined by the final cause. As ap­
pears from Peirce’s definitions o f final causation (as quoted in the 
first section), it is precisely this characteristic that distinguishes id e o ­
logical from mechanical behavior. A limerick by Maurice Evan Hare 
(1886-?), which was written as a reaction to the idea of determinism, 
may serve as a funny illustration o f this difference:
There once was a man who said, ‘Damn!
It is borne in upon me I am
An Engine that moves in determinate grooves,
I ’m not even a bus but a tram.’
The m otion  o f the bus is ideologically constrained by its terminus, 
w ithout its specific movements being determined by it. A tram, on 
the o ther hand, is bound to its tracks. According to determinism, 
that is to  say, according to the view that rejects final causation, man 
behaves m ore like a tram than like a bus, because everything he does 
is completely determined by mechanical causes. Thus, a teleological 
process, in general, is creative to the extent that, whenever one way 
or line o f  mechanical causation be blocked, it may originate new lines 
o f  action.29
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(3) So far, it has been assumed that the main purpose remains 
unchanged in the course o f the process. But in fact, it frequently 
happens that the main purpose develops into another one. The idea 
of writing a paper on teleology in Peirce, for example, might change 
into the idea of writing about efficient causation instead. This would 
be an instance of what Peirce has called “developmental teleology.” 
In Hausman’s words this is “ the view that there are purposes that 
may evolve spontaneously.” 30
Peirce uses the term “developmental teleology” only once, in his 
“The Law o f Mind” (JSPI, 312-33; 1892), which is intended chiefly 
to explain his synechism« The “law of mind” states, more or less, that 
all ideas tend to grow to a harmonious whole, and by doing so, lose 
intensity while gaining generality Applying this idea to human per­
sonality, Peirce concludes that a “personality is some kind of coordi­
nation or connection of ideas,” One of the most important constitu­
ents of a personality is its reference to future ends, which gradually 
come to be:
... this teleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit o f a 
predetermined end; it is a developmental teleology. This is per­
sonal character. A general idea, living and consciouss now, it 
is already determinative o f acts in the future to an extent 
which it is not now conscious. This reference to the future is 
an essential element o f  personality Were the ends of a per­
son already explicit, there would be no room for develop­
ment, for growth, for life; and consequently there would be 
no personality. The mere carrying out of predetermined pur­
poses is mechanical. (EP I, 331; italics mine)
Thus, growth refers to a process in which the purposes as such may 
evolve, But, ‘developmental teleology' is not restricted to human 
personality It is applicable to  the idea o f teleology in general: learn­
ing from the developmental aspect of our own human purposes, we 
can inductively infer that all final causes in nature are, at least in prin­
ciple, subject to evolution.
Thus, in the process of being realized, the final causes themselves 
may change. Moreover, final causes differ in degree o f generality, and 
the m o re  general ones can, while being realized, generate less gen­
eral, o r subordinate final causes. In Short’s words this means: “chance 
thus leads to new ends, but only when the new is a way of fulfilling a 
m ore general and already operative end.”31 The newly developed sub­
ord inate  final causes must fit within the overall scheme of the more 
general final cause. For instance, if the more general final cause is the 
idea o f  writing a paper on some aspect o f Peirce’s cosmology, then 
the change in idea from writing on Peirce’s conception of efficient 
causation to the idea o f writing on his concept of teleology, fits within 
the overall scheme of the more general final cause, Moreover, the 
new subordinate purposes, which arise by chance,32 are selected by 
the m ore  general final cause. This has far reaching consequences, as 
Short again so well expresses: “Final causation thus results, not in the 
dead uniformity o f  a single plan, but in the unpredictable heteroge­
neity o f  enterprises, personalities, and species that fill our world ...”33
III. Mayras Rejection of Final Causation
T h e  problem of teleology is, no doubt, most prominent in philo­
sophical discussions concerning biological evolution and biological 
behavior. The standard view nowadays is that, although teleological 
language may be indispensible to biology, the explanations o f bio­
logical processes must be given in terms o f efficient causation. Any 
reference to final causation is rejected. One of the major proponents 
o f  this view is Ernst Mayr. In this section I will use some o f Peirce’s 
insights to show that Mayr’s rejection of final causation is based on a 
n u m b er  o f dubious presuppositions. Furthermore, I will use Peirce’s 
theory  o f  final causation to argue that Mayr’s own solution to the 
p roblem  o f teleology is insufficient.
First, I will consider Mayr’s rejection of a teleological interpreta­
tion o f  biological evolution, and show that it is based on at least three 
dub ious presuppositions (see 3.1). Next, I will discuss two core ideas 
o f  M ay r’s own solution: I will examine Mayr’s dualism, i.e. his dis-
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tinction between seemingly and genuinely goal-directed processes, 
and show that it is based on an invalid argument (see 3,2). After that, 
I will examine Mayr’s idea o f a ‘program as responsible for genuinely 
goal-directed processes/ and show that, contrary to Mayr’s own opin­
ion, it agrees perfectly well with the (Peircean) idea of final causation 
(see 3.3).
3.1 The goal of evolution
According to Peirce, biological evolution is a perfect example of 
a finious process because (a) there is a definite tendency toward a 
state of relative stability, (b) the general end state is independent of 
whatever the various lines of mechanical causation that lead to it may 
be, and (c) the process is irreversible. That the best adapted species 
(or individuals)34 will survive may easily be predicted, independently 
of what species are considered, and regardless of the specific muta­
tions that may take place. Thus, explanations of this tendency do not 
require any reference to specific, concrete efficient causes, but only 
to th tgenem l principle of “survival of the fittest,” which functions as 
a principle of selection;3 3
More or less the same point is made by the contemporary evolu­
tionary biologist Ayala: the overall process of evolution cannot 
be said to be teleological in the sense of being directed towards the 
production of specified DNA codes of information, i.e. organisms. 
But it is my contention that it can be said to be teleological in the 
sense of being directed towards the production of DNA codes o f 
information which improve the reproductive fitness of a population 
in the environments were it lives.” 36
Mayr considers Ayala’s explanation to be a serious misinterpreta­
tion of the term ‘teleological:’
Natural selection is never goal oriented. It is misleading and 
quite inadmissible to designate such broadly generalized con­
cepts as survival or reproductive success as definite and speci­
fied goals. (1974, 96)
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Mayr’s rejection o f  a teleological interpretation of evolution is based 
on three dubious assumptions. First, as the quotation shows, Mayr 
has an unsound conception o f ‘goal’. As I have explained in the first 
part o f  this paper, goals are always general. Though there may be a 
difference in the degree of generality — some goals are less general 
than others —  there is always an element of generality involved. Sur­
vival and reproductive success are, o f course, very general concepts, 
as Ayala boldly admits. Mayr charges that Ayala’s referring to “com­
pletely generalized processes, rather than to specific goals” has ludi­
crous consequences. For instance, it would be “the goal of every 
evolutionary line to become extinct because this is what has hap­
pened to  99,9% o f  all evolutionary lines that have ever existed” (p.97). 
Clearly, Mayr here fails to see that teleological explanations — as 
Short has made clear in his brilliant, Peirce-inspired essay, “Teleology 
in N atu re”37 —  must explain a general tendency. The extinction of 
an evolutionary line does not, and cannot, as a final cause should, 
explain the process that generated that line, Consequently, such ex­
tinctions cannot possibly be final causes.
Secondly, Mayr identifies teleology with a completely determined, 
straightforward development toward a specific end, from which ev­
ery form o f creativity is expelled:
Natural selection rewards past events, that is the production 
o f  successful recombination o f genes, but it does not plan 
for the future. This is, precisely, what gives evolution by natu­
ral selection its flexibility. With the environment changing 
incessantly, natural selection — in contradiction to orthogen­
esis—  never commits itself to a future goal, (p.96; my italics)
According to Mayr, natural selection cannot be teleological because 
it is highly flexible; contrary to orthogenesis (the theory according to 
which evolution is nothing but the completely determined develop­
m ent o f  what was present in the beginning), evolution is not teleo­
logical because it does not involve a straightforward progression to a 
completely predetermined end.
201 Menno Hulswit
Mayr rightly stresses that evolution is a flexible process. There 
are, however, two problems with his explanation. First, it is not clear 
that the flexibility Mayr refers to, involves real creativity. Does objec­
tive chance play a crucial role in the process of evolution or is it a 
completely determined process? Only in the former case would bio­
logical evolution be inpredictable in principle; thus, even in the ficti­
tious case that we would have knowledge of all the relevant causal 
circumstances, we would still not be able to predict which species will 
evolve. The process is not determined in advance. Mayr’s insistence 
on “strictly causal and mechanistic” explanations, however, leads one 
to suspect that he rejects the idea of objective chance, The very con­
cept of flexibility involves a commitment to a goal. For a strict deter- 
minist, the concept o f flexibility has no meaning: que sera, sera. Thus, 
Mayr is faced with the following dilemma: if he acknowledges objec­
tive chance, he cannot insist on “strictly causal and mechanistic” ex­
planations. But if he rejects objective chance, he cannot possibly claim 
that evolution is flexible.
The other point is, that there are three reasons why Mayr’s iden­
tification of teleology with orthogenesis is mistaken: first, teleology 
does not imply orthogenesis at ail, because one of its main character­
istics is that it presupposes chance. Next, in teleological processes, 
the end state can be reached in various ways. Even if one does not 
agree with this Peircean criterion (but can one imagine other, better 
criteria?), he has to admit at least that there are processes in which the 
end state can be reached in different ways. This, however, is exactly 
what is precluded by orthogenesis.38 Finally, teleology does not pre­
suppose a completely fixed and determinate final end state. As Peirce 
has argued forcefully (see 2.4), final causes, while being realized, may 
become modified and developed. Teleology is basically developmen­
tal. Hence, contrary to orthogenesis, teleology is creative (in more 
than one way),
Thirdly, Mayr associates final causation with backward causation. 
In the quotation above, Mayr speaks o f ‘future goals,’ and elsewhere 
in his article he writes: “The assumption that future goals were the 
cause of current events seemed in complete conflict with any concept
o f causality” (p.93). Mayr is certainly right in rejecting the idea that 
future events could have an influence on present events. But he is 
mistaken in that he concludes that this entails that there cannot be 
any final causation. He too mistakenly considered final causes as be­
longing to the same genus as efficient causes. In the first part o f  this 
article I have used one o f Peirce’s insights to show that this is a cat­
egory mistake: final causes do not belong to the category o f concrete 
events, bu t to the category of general possibilities. Accordingly, final 
causation has nothing whatever in common with backward causa­
tion.
3.2 Mayr*s dualism
According to Mayr, nature is split up into two realms of “an 
entirely different nature:” the realm o f genuinely goal-directed p ro ­
cesses and the realm of seemingly goal-directed processes. But even 
the genuinely goal-directed processes can entirely be explained by 
efficient causation. Two questions are relevant here: (1) is it true that 
nature is split up into these two realms?, and (2) can all seemingly 
and all genuinely goal-directed processes be explained by efficient 
causation alone? In this section, the first question is explored; the 
second question is addressed partly in the present section, and partly 
in the next.
According to Mayr, the seemingly goal-directed processes which 
he calls teleomatic processes occur only in inanimate nature, They
... are ‘end-directed5 only in a passive, automatic way, regu­
lated by external forces or conditions. Since the end state of 
such inanimate objects is automatically achieved, such changes 
m igh t be designated as teleomatic. Ail teleomatic processes 
com e to an end when the potential is used up (as in the 
cooling o f  a heated piece of iron) or when the process is 
stopped by encountering an external impediment (as a fall­
ing stone hitting the ground). Teleomatic processes simply 
follow natural laws, i.e. lead to a result consequential to con­
com itant physical forces, and the reaching of their end state
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is no t contro lled  by a built-in program. The law of gravity 
and the second law o f  thermodynamics are among the natu­
ral laws which m ost frequently govern teleomatic processes
(p .98)
Genuinely end-d irected  or teleonomic processes differ in (at least) 
three repects from seemingly end-directed or teleomatic processes, 
Teleonom ic processes are marked by the following properties:
(1) the end state is no t reached automatically, and
(2) the process tow ard  the end state is controlled by a 
built-in p rogram ,
(3) the  end state is n o t determined by (a) external 
im pedim ents o r (b) by the condition that some potential 
is used up.
F u rtherm ore , te leonom ic processes occur only in living nature.
M ayr’s so-called fundamental distinction between teleonomic and 
teleom atic processes is based on four concepts: (1) automatism, (2) 
program , (3a) external im pedim ents, and (3b) potential exhaustion,
I will consider these one by one.
(1) T h e  end state o f  teleomatic processes is reached automati­
cally, that is to  say, it is the straightforward effect of natural laws; in 
contrast, th e  end  state o f  teleonom ic processes is completely deter­
m ined by a built-in program  (e.g. DNA, acquired habits, computer 
program s39). B ut obviously, program-directed behavior is just as au­
tomatic as ‘law -of-nature-directed’ processes: “Teleonomic processes an  
strictly causal a n d  mechanistic* (112, my italics). Consequently, 
teleonom ic processes are just as mechanical as teleomatic processes.
(2) Mayr defines program  provisionally as: “ coded or prearranged 
inform ation tha t controls a process (or behavior) leading it toward a 
given  end” (102). I f  we leave o u t “coded or prearranged informa­
tio n ” —  the  m eaning o f  which is not at all obvious — this conception 
o f  program  agrees perfectly well with the general concept of a law of 
nature, F o r (according to  the  realistic interpretation), laws of nature 
induce things to  behave in a definite way. We have considered already 
the law o f  gravity and the second law of thermodynamics; they are
good examples of general principles that “control a process leading it 
toward a given end.” Thus, nothing stands in our way o f considering 
laws o f  nature also as built-in programs. Consequently, the validity o f  
a real distinction between teleonomic and teleomatic processes on 
the basis tha t only the latter are directed by built-in programs, is 
debatable at best.
(3) Finally, according to Mayr, teleomatic processes, as opposed 
to teleonomic processes, come to an end (a) as the result o f  some 
external im pedim ent (as a falling stone hitting the ground), or (b) 
because some potential is used up (as in the cooling o f  a piece o f 
iron). But these criteria are both very vague. The first one is certainly 
ambiguous. For, what Mayr calls an external impediment might be 
called an internal impediment as well, depending on how the system 
is defined; and perhaps it even ought to be called an internal impedi­
ment. Thermodynamics usually studies isolated systems, and there 
are o f  course no isolated systems without boundary conditions. Thus, 
the boundary  conditions are part o f  the system, and what Mayr calls 
external impediments may just as well be called internal impediments. 
The second criterion is, taken by itself, too wide: an athlete who runs 
a race as fast as he can uses up his potential. According to Mayr’s 
terminology, this would be an example o f a teleomatic process, while 
it is clearly teleonomic.
H ence, the three criteria used by Mayr fail to support the distinc­
tion he makes between teleonomic and teleomatic processes. But more 
importantly, as we have seen in the first part, neither teleonomic nor 
teleomatic processes can be explained on the basis o f  mechanical cau­
sation alone; even our explanations of thermodynamic processes — 
according to  Mayr a plain instance of teleomatics —  need to refer to 
some general type which functions as a final cause. Therefore, there is 
no reason whatever to regard his distinction as fundamental,
3.3 M ayr’s idea o f a program as ccausally responsible’ for 
teleological processes
T he  key word in Mayr’s definition o f ‘teleonomic’ is the word 
‘program .’ The process tending to the end state is controlled by a
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built-in program, which “is .causally responsible for the teleonomic 
nature ofa  goal-directed process” (p.99; my italics). Apparently, there 
is no final causation involved in teleonomic processes.
Mayr gives two reasons why a program  is responsible for 
teleonomic behavior, and without thereby involving final causation: 
“a program is [1] something material, and [2] it exists prior to the 
initiation of a teleonomic process. Hence, it is consistent with a causal 
explanation” (p. 102). The argument involves three premisses, all of 
which are dubious: (a) information (a program) is something mate­
rial, (b) causes are always material, (c) causes always precede their 
effects.
What it means to say that a program is something material, is by 
no means clear. The concept of matter is a philosophical concept 
with a long history; if one wishes to use it as a key concept, he is 
obliged to clarify its meaning. But, the concept o f matter involves at 
least something spatio-temporal, i.e. something that can be indicated 
in space and time. One should know therefore in what sense a ‘pro­
gram’ refers to something spatio-temporal.
Granted, the information o f the program needs a substrate (a 
‘material’ carrier), but this does not imply that it is identical with its 
substrate. Though the substrate can be indicated in space and time, 
information itself can not, because it is general and not concrete, 
Indeed, the same information content may be inscribed in different 
‘material’ substrates, and the same substrate may carry a different 
information. In Aristotelian terms, one might say that the informa­
tion refers to form, not to the matter. It is the form  that matters, not 
the matter that (in)forms.
The two other presuppositions of Mayr were that (b) causes need 
to be material, and (c) that they always precede their effects. Are 
these true? The least one can say is that the debate is not closed; there 
may be mental causes as well as physical ones, and many causes are 
contemporaneous with their effects. Thus, these two presuppositions 
are by no means obvious.
But apart from these considerations, there are other difficulties 
with Mayr’s concept o f ‘program.’ He stipulates that:
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... it is in the nature of a teleonomic program that it does not 
induce a simple unfolding of some completely preformed 
Gestalt, but that it always controls a more or less complex 
process which must allow for internal and external disturban­
ces. (p.99)
Mayr might be very surprised to discover that this description of the 
functioning o f  a program agrees perfectly well with Peirce’s concept 
o f  final causation; the process toward the end state is not “completely 
preformed” but “flexible,” and the end state itself is independent of 
the various different efficient causes. Final causes — so we have writ­
ten in section 2 — “are general types that tend to realize themselves 
by determining processes of mechanical causation.” If  ‘causally re­
sponsible5 should be interpreted as ‘due to final causation,5 there would 
not be any problem. But obviously, this is not what Mayr means, for 
he holds that “ teleonomic explanations are strictly causal and mecha­
nistic” (p .114).
Mayr fails to explain what he means by ‘causal.’ I can only inter­
pret him as follows: a program is an efficient cause, which in combi­
nation with other efficient causes (the internal and external distur­
bances), completely determines the end state of a process or behav­
ior. If so, then Mayr owes us an explanation of how, under different 
circumstances, and thus, given different sets of efficient causes, the 
same program may lead processes to the same general end state.
More importantly: how can programs be considered as efficient 
causes at all? O r put more concisely: is there a theory of efficient 
causation that meets with the idea o f a program?40 That seems un­
likely, for efficient causes are singular events or facts, while programs 
are not. Programs, however, are, as Peirce would say, of the nature of 
a habit.41 And habits are always general, and this in a double sense:
(a) contrary to concrete efficient causes, habits not only induce one 
or more lines of mechanical causation at one singular moment, but 
they start new lines whenever possible. Besides, (b) a habit never 
completely determines # / /characters of the end state toward which it 
leads; for example, the habit of smoking does not (completely) deter­
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mine how and how often one smokes. Accordingly, we may safely 
conclude that Mayr’s conception of teleonomics is, to borrow his 
own expression (which he uses to refute teleology), “in complete 
conflict with any concept o f causality” (p.93).
Mayr’s critique of teleology is partly based on the mistaken as­
sumption that the conception o f  (efficient) causality is unproblematic. 
But this assumption is a myth, which is, unfortunately, widespread 
among philosophers and scientists alike, An adequate account of the 
problem of teleology requires a thorough analysis of the concept of 
efficient causation, Nothing is gained by unmasking the supposed 
myth of teleology by banking on yet another myth.
IV  Conclusion
In the first part o f this paper an outline was given o f Peirce’s 
theory of final causation. In the second part, some o f  Peirce’s in­
sights were used to show that Mayr’s theory of teleology is flawed. I 
chose to discuss Mayr’s view, partly because he has had an enormous 
influence on contemporary discussions, and partly because it illus­
trates a number of dubious presuppositions which are to be found in 
most of the current discussions.
According to Peirce, final causes are (a) general types that tend 
to realize themselves by determining processes o f  mechanical causa­
tion, They are (b) not future events, but general (physical) possibili­
ties. The symptoms of final causation are: (i) the end state of a pro­
cess can be reached in different ways, and (ii) the process is irrevers­
ible.
Peirce rejects the idea of a bifurcation of nature into two kinds of 
fundamentally different substances or processes. Hence, he rejects 
the view that final and efficient causation are two basically different 
types of causation, On the contrary, they are complementary inas­
much as there is in each act of causation an efficient and a final com­
ponent, He also rejects the idea that there exists a class o f mechanical 
processes next to teleological processes. A ll  processes are teleologi­
cal; mechanical processes are simply teleological processes with a low
grade o f  finality.
Moreover, teleology presupposes objective chance, and thus, there 
is an aspect o f  irreducible novelty at every stage of a process. But 
teleology also involves novelty in the choice of the different routes 
that lead to a specified general end state, and in the possible evolu­
tion of the final causes themselves (“developmental teleology”).
It was shown that Mayr’s dismissal of a teleological interpreta­
tion of biological evolution is based on the rejection of three proper­
ties which he mistakenly attributes to the concept o f final causation. 
Mayr imagines final causes to involve:
(a) individual events,
(b) an influence of the present upon the future (backward 
causation),
(c) a straightforward, completely determined course toward the 
end state (which entails the absence of any form of novelty).
I f  this analysis is correct, Mayr’s rejection of final causation is based 
on a fatal misunderstanding of the nature of teleological processes. 
Moreover, it was shown that Mayr’s distinction between genuinely 
end-directed or teleonomic processes and seemingly end-directed or 
teleomatic processes is essentially without foundation. Furthermore, 
it was shown that, contrary to Mayr’s opinion, both teleonomic and 
teleomatic processes require an explanation by final causation. Fi­
nally, I have examined the key concept in Mayr’s idea of teleonomics, 
which is the idea o f a program. I have shown that, contrary to Mayr’s 
opinion, programs are good examples of final causes.
Mayr’s mistakes are largely due to two false premises which are 
characteristic o f  nearly all contemporary debates on teleology The 
first o f these is that he regards final causes as belonging to the same 
genus as efficient causes. A hundred years ago, Peirce has shown that 
this is a category mistake: contrary to efficient causes, final causes are 
not individual events or facts, but general principles.
The second false premiss is the assumption that we have a clear 
concept o f efficient causation. Harmful though both premisses may 
be, the second o f  these is by far the most ferocious. The failure to see 
that causation is a philosophical problem instead o f  a clearcut, self-
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evident idea, proves to be fatal to Mayr’s analysis.
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[final causes] as forces in the material sense” (CP 1.265, 1902).
11. For Peirce’s “ethics o f  terminology,” see K.L. Ketner, “Peirce’s 
Ethics o f  Terminology,” Transactions o f the Charles S. Peirce Society, 1981, vol. 
XVII, no 4, 327-47.
12. There are some important differences between Aristotle’s no ­
tion of  efficient cause and the modern notion. Perhaps the most important one 
is that according to Aristotle, efficient causes are related to things, and accord­
ing to the modern theory, they are either events or facts.
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13, According to Peirce, the idea o f  final causation is even more 
original than the idea o f  efficient causation. Consider for example the two fol­
lowing quotations: “For the very type, and prototype of  what the word cause 
means is the sense in which, for example, my desire for fresh air may cause me 
to rise from my chair, cross the room, and open the window” (MS 1343,1902). 
There is no doubt that this is an instance o f  final causation, and not o f  efficient 
causation: who is acquainted with the fundamentals of dynamics that if 
physical forces obey the law o f  the conservation o f  energy, then a volition can­
not be a force, For a volition tends to bring about a result and if circumstances 
are varied the action will be varied, so far as may seem necessary to bring about 
that result; while a force acting according to the law o f  energy does not act 
in this way” (MS 1343), A last quotation to support my point: “The very con­
ception of causality has its origin in our tendency to seek relations in nature 
analogous to intellectual relations” (MS 963).
14, According to Short (1981, 372, 375), these statistical laws, 
and final causes in general, are nothing but tautologies. I think that Short makes 
a mistake here. Final causes are characterized by an inherent drive toward real­
ization, which can never be said of tautologies. Short seems to consider the 
statistical laws as “purely mathematical.” In a sense he is right: they are math­
ematical in form. But they always refer to distributions o f  physical phenomena. 
Mathematical laws are no t in themselves final causes; they do not determine 
anything but mathematical entities. Final causes are physical possibilities, not 
just logical or mathematical possibilities. That Short does not refer to the tau to­
logical nature o f  statistical laws in his 1983 article, may indicate that he 
abandonned this view.
15, Characteristic o f  a triadic relationship is that it cannot be re­
solved into (two) dyadic relationships.
16, In the next section I will explain that the final causation o f  
mechanistic laws is a degenerate kind of final causation.
17, T.L. Short, 1981, 374; also 1983, 317. Helmut Pape too,
seems to think that there are purely mechanical processes. He correctly stresses 
that “ the paradigm of  non-teleological action is mechanical action.” But when 
he writes “We have to explain what it would mean to have a sequence o f  events 
without a final cause,” he presupposes that there are any processes in nature 
that are not controlled by a final cause, and that those are consequently purely
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mechanical. See: H e lm u t Pape, “Final Causality in Peirce’s Semiotics and His 
Classification o f  the  Sciences,” Transactions o f the Charles S. Peirce Society, Fall 
1993, Vol. X X I X , No. 4, 581- 607; see esp. 588-9.
18. “T h e  distinction between psychical and physical phenomena 
is the distinction between final and efficient causation” ( C P 7.366, 1902).
19. See for example: C P 6 .1 7 3 ,1902; CP 1.487,1896; CP 1.624- 
25> 1898.
20. See R L T , 218-20, 1898; also W I.422 , 1866!
21. See M S  1343, 26-7 ,1902 ; CP6.322, c.1909.
22. iiXT, 1992, 87; see also note 52, p. 278.
23. T he  idea that ‘objective chance1 refers to ‘absolutely uncaused 
events* is held by Peirce from 1880 till at least 1884 (see MS 674 and “Design 
and C hance ,” EP  I, 217; 1884). During this period, the discussion is not yet 
placed within  the context o f  his categoreal scheme. It would appear that every 
event involves an aspect o f  firstness, secondness, and thirdness. This entails that 
every event involves an element o f  objective chance, efficient causation, and 
final causation.
24. This presupposes that Peirce held an event ontology. The most 
convincing passage I know of  that supports this view is: “ ... individual exist­
ence, in the strictest sense, only belongs to a single event which happens when 
and where it does and  has no other being. For though we speak, for example, o f  
Phillip o f  M acedon as an individual, yet ‘Phillip drunk1 and ‘Phillip sober7 were 
different. T h e  ‘existing’ thing is only individual in the sense o f  being a continu­
ous law regulating and  unifying events o f  a series of instants” (MS, 478, 47-8, 
1903), O n e  has to realize, however, that for Peirce, events are not discrete 
inasmuch as they do not have a definite beginning and a definite end (See “The 
Law o f  M ind ,” especially the section on the continuity o f  ideas, £ P I ,  314-5).
25. At this moment (1892), Peirce does not yet make a funda­
mental distinction between events and facts. Though he seems to subscribe in 
his later writings to an event ontology, he is at the same time very definite about 
the relata o f  the causal relation. They are not events, but facts. By ‘fact1 he 
means an abstracted part o f  an event. See, for example R L T , 198 ,1898.
26. See note 23.
27. Carl Hausman, “Eros and Agape in Creative Evolution: A 
Peircean Insight,” in: Process Studies, vol. 4, no 1, 1974, 14.
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28. C ha r I e s H  a rs th o r n e, Creati v e Synthesis and Ph ilasopbic Met ho d, 
Lanham /New York/London, Univcrstiy Press o f  America, 1983 (1970), p. 
34, See also p.8.
29. A good example which shows that in the choice o f  routes there 
is creativity involved, is the idea to write a book on a certain theme. It is clear 
that the way the subject is handled, forms a crucial part o f  the creative process. 
Different routes may lead to different books on the same subject,
30. Carl R. Ha us man, Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 175.
31. T.L. Short, “Review of Carl Hausman’s Charles S. Peirce’s Evolu­
tionary Philosophy ” Transactions o f the Charles S, Peirce Society' 1994, vol, XXX, 
No. 2 ,4 0 6 .
32. During the realization o f  a final cause, there is always the 
confrontation with the material world. This is the ground for the evolution of 
new final causes, New ideas (purposes) do not happen just by chance, but only 
as a response to an actual problematic situation, I think it is precisely this that 
Peirce was referring to when he wrote; “The way in which mind [read: final 
causation] acts upon matter [read: chains o f  efficient causation] is by imposing 
upon it conformity to certain peculiar laws, called purposes; and the manner of 
the reaction is that the purposes themselves become modified and developed in 
being thus carried out (M S  478, 18, 1903),” Consequently, developmental 
teleology requires more than just chance; it presupposes an interrelated activity 
o f  chance, efficient causation, and final causation. (This agrees with Sandra 
RosenthaPs conclusion that developmental teleology can only be understood 
in terms o f  all three o f  the Peircean categories; Sandra Rosenthal, Charles S, 
Peirce’s Pragmatic Pluralism} Albany, New York, State University o f  New York 
Press, 1994, 125.)
33. T.L. Short, 1994,406.
34. The problem whether natural selection takes place on the level 
o f  species or o f  individuals, will not be discussed here. It is still a hot topic in 
evolutionary biology, In Peirce’s view natural selection is about types, and not 
about individuals (EP  I, 272, c.1887).
35. See W 4,46 ,1880; C P 6 .2 9 6 ,1893; MS 1343,1902; C P I . 204,
1.269,2.86: all 1902.
36. Ayala, 1970, 11.
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37. I do not claim to be original here: the same point has been
made before  by Short in his “Teleology in Nature” (1983, esp. 314-5). Short 
correctly warns against misinterpreting the idea o f  a teleological interpretation 
of  biological evolution: “a teleological interpretation of  biological evolution 
does n o t  entail that the aim of  evolution is a single, “highest” species. On the 
contrary, if a final cause is a general type, then it might be actualized in any 
number o f  different ways. As Darwin emphasized, the principle o f  the survival 
o f  the fit test entails a divergence of  species to fill all o f  the available ecological 
niches” (1981 ,  372).
3 8. The other way around, orthogenesis — if there were such a thing
— does n o t  imply teleology either, for it is a completely mechanical process.
39 . T he  word ‘program1 is taken from the language o f  informa­
tion theory . Since the paradigmatic example o f  a computer program is com ­
pletely mechanistic (deterministic), the analogous use o f  the word program to 
situations that  might not be deterministic at all is misleading. Though there 
may be com puter  programs that agree perfectly well with Peirce’s definitions o f  
final causation, there are serious reasons to believe that Peirce would consider 
most com pu te r  programs as at most quasi-teleological. Usually, the program 
completely determines not only the results, but also (if there are different ways) 
which ways will be taken toward the results. Hence, this is a perfect example o f  
a mechanistic process (see MS 1343 and CP 6.322). But there might also be 
program s, and I bet there are, where there is a randommizer built in, and a 
principle that  selects certain kinds o f  behavior. In that case there might be real 
teleology involved. The problem, though very important for our discussion, is 
too b ig  to  handle here.
4 0 .  For an overview o f  contemporary theories o f  causation, see 
the in troduction  of: Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (eds.), Causation, Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1993.
41 .  The word habit is used here in a broad sense: Mayr’s “com- 
pletely genetically fixed programs” (102) may also be regarded as genetically 
fixed habits. Peirce: “ habit plays somewhat the same part in the history o f  the 
individual that natural selection does in that o f  the species; namely, it causes 
actions to  be directed towards ends” ( W/4, 46; 1880).
